Posted by D.E.ROADEN on 8/25/03

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I am a pro se litigant and require assistance, this action
was filed on 08/19/03, I would have no problem with a
substantial contingency fee, $908,640 in claims, I will
mail compiled exhibits upon request, footnotes follow text.

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF
JASPER COUNTY MISSOURI
DIVISION , AT JOPLIN

Douglas E. Roaden, )
plaintiff, )
)
v. )
) Cause
No.
Jon Dermott, Dean Dankelson, )
George Thomas, Blake Wolf, )
Nick Marshall, Norm Rouse; )
W.J. Pierce, )
defendants. )

I. PETITION FOR STATE TORT ACTION
UNDER PROVISION OF §§ 516.100 - 516.140.
COMES NOW Plaintiff Douglas E. Roaden in propria persona
and, for his cause of action against defendants, states
and alleges as follows:
FACTS
On the date of 07/13/99, while incarcerated on a term of 3
years for felony forgery, (Lawrence County, CR496-563 FX
and CR496-564FX, cc.) in the Western Missouri Correctional
Center at Cameron Missouri, (hereinafter referred to as
W.M.C.C.) plaintiff issued a letter of request for
information pertaining to a pending Jasper County charge
to Kathleen McGuire, who was the Circuit Clerk of Jasper
County at Joplin, MO (see exhibits B1; B2, included with
parcel, plaintiff was unsure of the number of charges
pending).
On the date of 07/23/99, W.J. Pierce who was the Sheriff
of Jasper County Missouri, lodged detainers on 2 of a
total of 6 charges that were actually pending against
plaintiff, (see exhibits C1; C2, included with parcel,
plaintiff has yet to ascertain why due “DUE NOTICE” of all
6 charges was not accorded).

On the date of 07/27/99, the W.M.C.C. records dept. issued
an “INMATES REQUEST FOR DISPOSITION OF INDICTMENTS,
INFORMATIONS OR COMPLAINTS” (hereinafter referred to
as “THE REQUEST” RSMo. §217.450) which included only the 2
charges that were listed on the aforementioned detainers,
(see exhibit D1, included with parcel).
On the date of 08/04/99, “THE REQUEST”was received by the
Associate Division at Carthage, MO at this time an
administrator altered this signed and dated legal document
by handwriting 2 additional case numbers on to “THE
REQUEST” but still did not include the one that pertains
to this present action, CR499-487FX, (see exhibit D2,
included with parcel).
On the date of 01/10/00, 159 days into the 180 time limit
on “THE REQUEST” plaintiffs person was secured by the
Jasper County Sheriffs Dept. on a writ of Habeas Corpus Ad
Prosequendum which included all 6 charges pending against
him, (see exhibits E1; E2, included with parcel) the
misdemeanor charges were dismissed on the date of 01/25/00
as part of an agreement to waive associate level
preliminary, (see exhibits F1; BB1, included with parcel)
on that same day plaintiff made his public defender
Kathleen Byrnes-Ales aware of “THE REQUEST”, she indicated
that she would consult with her office in order to prepare.
On the date of 02/02/00, (4 days after the 180 day time
limit on “THE REQUEST” had expired) plaintiff appeared
before Jon Dermott, who is the Judge of the Circuit Court
Division III at Carthage, MO for circuit level
arraignment. At this time plaintiff inquired as to his
public defenders preparedness and was informed that she
did not know how to proceed, arraignment was waived with
no entry for dismissal. Plaintiff was transported back to
W.M.C.C. to await circuit level preliminary set for date
of 04/03/00.
Over a period of 2 or 3 months afterward a number of
hearings were held in this matter without plaintiffs
presence, it was determined by the court that the 2 felony
charges that were actually listed on “THE REQUEST” were to
be dismissed under provision of the U.M.D.D.L. §§ 217.450 -
217.490, but that prosecutorial action would continue on
the one felony charge (CR499-487FX) that was not listed,
(fn.1) even though it arose from the “same transaction”
also a principal of the U.M.D.D.L. by virtue of
provisional import from the A.O.D. §217.490, Article V,
sub.sec.4, and was also listed on the ad prosequendum writ
issued by the district attorneys office.
Plaintiff eventually lost faith in his public defender and
initiated his own effort to make his legal position known
to the court and the district attorneys office, plaintiff
filed a pro se pre-trial motion for dismissal which
included 3 amendments, (fn.2) (see exhibits G1...G27,
included with parcel) the last of which was filed on
09/01/00. (fn.3)
During this entire period of time, from the date of
expiration on “THE REQUEST” 01/31/00, through the
withdrawal date of the detainers 09/07/00, (see exhibits
M1; M2, included with parcel, this last date being just 6
days after plaintiff filed his 3rd amendment), the Jasper
County Sheriffs Dept. unlawfully maintained the original
form of the detainers against plaintiff. (fn.4)
On the date of 09/22/00, plaintiff was released from
W.M.C.C. on parole status with this charge still pending,
(fn.5) and was ordered to appear before Jon Dermott in
Division III Court on the date of 09/25/00 to face
criminal proceedings related to CR499-487FX.
For a period of 2 ½ to 3 months this issue was haggled
over with the public defender who was unable to appreciate
the complexities involved and who suggested that plaintiff
not prohibit the trial court for fear of enraging the
prosecution and thereby incur a 10 year sentence of wrath,
plaintiff eventually capitulated and on the date of
01/06/01 made an unconstitutional plea bargain in order to
remove this burden.(fn.6)
After returning to the Dept. of Corrections plaintiff
filed under Rule 24.035. for post conviction relief but
did not have any real expectation that the trial court
would reverse it’s decision in light of the fact that the
Judge had already supposedly reviewed the material related
to this matter. (fn.7) (see exhibits G9 & G22)
On the date of 08/28/01, the trial court did in fact
vacate and dismiss this case, yet the post fact
information pertaining to this matter is still being
maintained as a conviction in plaintiffs D.O.C. file,
plaintiff has filed a motion for an amended order before
the trial court to have this information expunged in
accordance with the spirit of the law, and also a notice
of motion on the date of 07/12/03, (exhibit L18) in a
further recent effort to have the trial court comply and
has received no response to date, (see exhibits L1...L18,
included with parcel).
These matters have been previously filed before the
Western District Federal Court where they were dismissed
as being legally frivolous under the erroneous assumption
that absolute judicial immunity applies to judges under a
loss of subject matter jurisdiction and that quasi
judicial immunity applies to prosecutors when acting in
contravention of law, (fn.8) plaintiff appealed this
matter to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals and the
Federal District Courts dismissal was subsequently
affirmed, no opinion was issued. A request for Panel
Rehearing was additionally denied, whereupon a Petition
for Writ of Certiorari to the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals was filed to the U.S.S.Ct. and was also denied.
(See exhibits N1...N60, included with parcel) However,
according to the law, as will be shown in plaintiffs legal
theory, there are valid claims within this action, and
case law at state, federal and supreme court levels that
support plaintiffs contentions.

OPENING STATEMENT
It is plaintiffs contention from the outset of this action
that the defendants named herein were acting in a personal
capacity under color of law and were functioning outside
the framework of their official duties, in merely acting
with a semblance of their official status while under a
loss of subject matter jurisdiction, and in contravention
of the law, they have removed themselves from immunity
under the law.

LEGAL THEORY
ABUSE OF PROCESS
Upon expiration of the 180 time limit under provision of
the U.M.D.D.L. §217.460. The trial court will have “lost
jurisdiction over the charge” and retains no
authority “except to dismiss the charge” State ex rel.
Suitor v. Stremel, 968 S.W. 2d 221, 225, (Mo. App. S.D.
1998).
“The provisions of the U.M.D.D.L. are not drenched in
ambiguity, and a loss of subject matter jurisdiction
inexorably occurs by operation of the law when......not
brought to trial within the appropriately determined
statutory time period.” Carson v. State, 997 S.W. 2d 92,
98, (Mo. App. S.D. 1999), citing Russell v. State, 597
S.W. 2d 694, 697, (Mo. App. W.D. 1980). “A court that
lacks jurisdiction over a criminal charge also lacks
jurisdiction to accept a plea of guilty to that charge.”
Carson, at 98. When Judge Jon Dermott issued a warrant for
plaintiffs arrest, falsely imprisoned plaintiff, compelled
plaintiff to appear before His Court to accept plaintiffs
plea on the date of 12/06/01, and subsequently sentenced
plaintiff to a 3 year term of incarceration, Judge Jon
Dermott did so without jurisdiction of the subject matter,
with absolutely “no authority for continuing to compel...”
plaintiff’s “...attendance in court under...” a capias
warrant and continuation of process, Stafford v. Muster,
582 S.W. 2d 670, 679 (Mo. Banc. 1979).
The letter issued to plaintiff by the court clerks office,
(see exhibit G9) as well as the letter issued to
plaintiffs public defender by Judge Dermott, (fn.9) (see
exhibit G22) on the surface indicate that the judge had
reviewed the information contained within plaintiffs pre-
trial pleadings, the judge was therefore aware of the
principals presented inter alia. “A motion to dismiss for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction should be granted
whenever it appears that the court lacks such
jurisdiction.” Rule 55.27(g)(3). “The term appears
suggests that the quantum of proof is not high.” Crofts v.
Harrison, 772 S.W. 2d 901, 902 (Mo. App. E.D. 1989),
citing Parmer v. Bean, 636 S.W. 2d 691, 694 (Mo. App.
1982), “The movant is not required to show by unassailable
proof that there is no material issue of fact, because the
trial court need only decide the preliminary question of
it’s own jurisdiction...” Crofts, at 902, citing Zahn v.
Associated Dry Goods Corp. 665 S.W. 2d 769, 772 (Mo. App.
1982). Plaintiff has presented the cases cited within this
paragraph to indicate the minimal requirement of the
movants/petitioners position under a request for
consideration of the courts lack of jurisdiction.
“This court must treat all facts as true and construe the
allegations favorably to the pleader, and the
interpretation given the petition must be reasonable, fair
and intended by the pleader.” Gatlin v. Truman Medical
Center, 770 S.W. 2d 510, 511 (Mo. App. 1989), cited in
Beth Hamdrosh Hagodal Cemetery Ass’n v. Levy, 923 S.W. 2d
439, 442 (Mo. App. E.D. 1996). This statement begs the
question of why plaintiffs pre-trial motion was not given
a fair interpretation.
Regardless of plaintiffs P.D.’s failure to respond
properly to these matters an issue such as this should be
reviewed by the court sua sponte, “In fact, a court has
the duty to sua sponte inquire and determine as to whether
or not it has jurisdiction.” In the Interest of D.L.D.,
701 S.W. 2d 152, 156 (Mo. App. 1985),”A court which does
not have subject matter jurisdiction has no recourse but
to dismiss the cause.” Collins & Associates Dietary
Consultants, Inc. V. Labor and Industrial Relations Com’n,
724 S.W. 2d 243, 245 (Mo. Banc. 1987) as the effect of
action under a lack of subject matter jurisdiction is the
only condition throughout the expansive base of the law
that would remove a judicial officer, in the performance
of a judicial act, from absolute immunity and expose his
person to civil action,“... judge is not immune for
actions, though judicial in nature, taken in complete
absence of all jurisdiction.” Mirales v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9,
112 S.Ct. 286, 288, 116 L. Ed. 2d 9. This matter was
viewed with such indifference that no court record even
exists, (see exhibit AA).
“The immunity afforded judges and prosecutors is not
absolute. A judge lacks immunity where he acts in
the “clear absence of all jurisdiction,” Ashelman v. Pope,
93 F. 2d 1072, 1075 (9th Circuit 1986), citing Bradley v.
Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall) 335, 20 L. Ed. 646.
“The language in Bradley...... more fully reads “clear
absence of all jurisdiction over the subject matter.” at
351, cited in Dykes v. Hosemann, 776 F. 2d 942, 948 (11th
Circuit 1985). “Three possible meanings may be gleaned
from the “clear absence of all jurisdiction” requirement,
judicial immunity is lost (1) only if both subject matter
and personal jurisdiction is absent, (2) if subject matter
jurisdiction exists but personal jurisdiction is lacking,
or (3) if subject matter jurisdiction is lacking. The
first two possibilities seem foreclosed...... Therefore,
the court seems to adopt the third possibility and
requires the absence of subject matter jurisdiction to
defeat a claim of immunity.” Dykes, at 955. “A judge acts
in the clear absence of all jurisdiction if the matter
over which he acts is clearly out side of the subject
matter jurisdiction of the court over which he presides.”
Dykes, at 947, citing Holloway v. Walker, 765 F. 2d 517,
523 (5th Circuit !985). By continuing this process with
foreknowledge Judge Jon Dermott has removed himself from
protection under the doctrine of absolute judicial
immunity. “Where there is clearly no jurisdiction over the
subject-matter any authority exercised is a usurped
authority, and for the exercise of such authority, when
the want of jurisdiction is known to the judge, no excuse
is permissible.” Bradley, at 352.
A pleading alleging abuse of process must set forth
ultimate facts establishing the following elements, (1)
the present defendant made an illegal, perverted or
improper use of process, a use neither warranted nor
authorized by the process, (2) the defendant had an
improper purpose in exercising such illegal, perverted or
improper purpose, and (3) damage resulted. Stafford, at
678.
Element (1) statutory direction does not allow for
continuation of the process beyond the 180 day time limit,
hence issuance of an arrest warrant is an improper use of
process. Element (2) continuing to compel plaintiffs
attendance in court in order to accept an unconstitutional
guilty plea is an improper purpose. Element (3) false
imprisonment and medically documented mental anguish are
actual damages.

MALICIOUS PROSECUTION
When the District Attorneys Office ordered the Sheriffs
Department to withdraw the detainers in response to
plaintiffs pre-trial motion, (exhibits G22...G27, 3rd
amendment) an acknowledgment signifying an awareness of
plaintiffs unlawful detainment was declared, this action
indicates that the District Attorneys Office had become
familiar with plaintiffs legal position contained within
the information submitted in his pre-trial motion and
amendments.
The principals, statutory direction and case law
pertaining to this matter are available in abundance, and
all of this material points to the same conclusion, it is
not difficult therefore to ascertain that only those who
are ...“plainly incompetent or those who would knowingly
violate the law,” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106
S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed. 2d 271 (1986), would refuse to apply
them.
Any issue of “...reasonable specificity...” as
to “...whether statutory or case law supports the
existence and constructive notice of the rights that
plaintiff claims were violated,” Romer v. Morganthau, 119
F. Supp. 2d 346, 355 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) is supported in
plaintiffs behalf, and made evident, in that plaintiff
went to painful ends to inform the defendants of the
principals of “same transaction” §217.490. Article V,
sec.4; State v. Howell, 818 S.W. 2d 681, 682, 683 (Mo.
App. W.D. 1991), of “form and substance of detainers”
Carson v. State, 997 S.W. 2d 92, 97 (Mo. App. S.D. 1999),
of “good faith effort and burden of compliance” Missouri
Criminal Trial Practice, §2-28; Jamison v. State, 918 S.W.
2d 889 (Mo. App. 1996); Suitor v. Stremel, 968 S.W. 2d 221
(Mo. App. S.D. 1998); State ex rel. Saxton v. Moore, 598
S.W. 2d 586, of “para materia” or “provisional import,”
Kemp v. Hodge, 629 S.W. 2d 353, 359 (Mo. Banc. 1982),
of “liberal construction and statutory purpose” §217.490.
Article IX; State v. Mack, 12 S.W. 3d 349 (Mo. App. W.D.
2000), that “Any request shall operate as request for
final disposition of all indictments, informations or
complaints” §217.490. Article III, sec.4, and of
the “fundamental nature of prisoner detainers” (exhibits
G22...G27), all of this material was included in
plaintiffs pre-trial motion, (exhibits G1...G27).
In the absence of the trial courts transcripts, (exhibit
AA) plaintiff has had to rely on supposition based on case
law study in an effort to determine from what position the
District Attorneys Office was able to persuade the Judge
that legitimacy could be lent to a continuation of this
process. First of all there is no statutory direction that
allows for it under the conditions here, the only instance
in case law that would is the erroneous, therefore non-
applicable and vastly expanded “specific request
requirement” to be found in, Duncan v. State, 864 S.W. 2d
431 (Mo. App. E.D. 1993), and Dillard v. State, 931 S.W.
2d 157 (Mo. App. W.D. 1996), this statement, “such a right
is specific to that case and does not carry forward to any
new charge even if based on similar facts” Duncan, at 433,
was made in reference to the Speedy Trial Act §545.780.
not the U.M.D.D.L. §§217.450. - 217.490. The error occurs
when “the statement” is expressed in the points of the
case, where it is assigned the wrong statute reference
number, Duncan, 2 at 431. It was transported into
Dillard, and expanded in the point, 15 at 158, and in
the explanation, at 165, the error was identified in
Carson, 997 S.W. 2d 92, 99, 100 (Mo. App. S.D. 1999), and
explained, (exhibits G3, sec.VIII; G23, sec.VII.) in
plaintiffs pre-trial motion. (fn.10)
Even being unaccustomed to the interpretation and
construction of the law plaintiff was able to determine
that these applications were evident, that full
comprehension is not required in order to appreciate the
basis of these fundamental principals, and “that
defendants, charged with knowledge of the law,” Stafford,
at 678, acted in these proceedings with
malice, ...”knowing they were wrongful...” at 678.”We hold
only in initiating a prosecution and in presenting the
states case, the prosecutor is immune from a suit for
civil damages under §1983. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S.
409, 96 S.Ct. 984, 995, 47 L. Ed. 2d 128. Plaintiffs
contention here states that the defendant prosecutors in
this case were acting in contravention of legislatively
mandated law.
“The elements of an action for malicious prosecution are,
(1) the commencement or prosecution of the proceedings
against the present plaintiff, (2) its legal causation or
instigation by the present defendant, (3) its termination
in favor of the present plaintiff, (4) the absence of
probable cause for such proceeding, (5) the presence of
malice therein, and (6) damage by reason thereof,”
Stafford, at 675.
Stipulation to elements (1) and (2) is presumed, element
(3) (see exhibit L14), element (4) “...under the facts
stated...” there was “...no lack of probable cause at the
commencement of the action,” however, maintaining legal
action “...beyond the scope of...” statutory direction
indicates that, “there was no probable cause to continue
the...” U.M.D.D.L. “... proceedings in such
circumstances.” Stafford, at 676. Malicious continuation
is sufficient to indicate a lack of probable cause, see
King v. Ryals, 981 S.W. 2d 151, 154, 5 (Mo. App. E.D.
1998). Element (5) plaintiff believes the District
Attorneys Office was acting in retaliation for previously
dismissed charges and were therefore disinclined to accept
plaintiffs legal position. “Rule 55.15 provides,
Malice...and any other condition of mind of a person may
be averred generally.” Stafford, at 676. (Fn.11) “Our
courts recognize that malice may be implied from the
reckless disregard of anothers rights and interests.”
Garvis v. K-Mart Discount Stores, 461 S.W. 2d 317, 324
(K.C. App. 1970). Element (6) false imprisonment and
medically documented mental anguish are actual damages.

UNLAWFUL DETAINMENT/FALSE IMPRISONMENT
Plaintiff has been unable to discover case law based on
unlawful prisoner detainers, however the fact of the
unlawful detainer in the instant is undisputable, if there
is no direct parallel or allowance for it in and of
itself, it must be viewed in the context of false
imprisonment, therefore actionable under that claim.
Having presented this position plaintiff will endeavor to
express parallel analogous principals, the two elements of
false imprisonment are, that (1) the defendant detains or
restrains the plaintiff against his will, (the record
reflects plaintiffs will) and (2) the detention or
restraint was unlawful, defendant’s withdrawal of
detainers on 09/07/00, (exhibit M1; M2) and the trial
courts eventual vacation of conviction were acts of
acquiescence of its unlawful nature.
One analogous principal of case law is that, “Any
unreasonable delay in releasing a person who is entitled
to be released, or such delay in calling, taking him
before or turning him over to proper
authorities,......would therefore amount to false
imprisonment.” Teel v. May Department Stores Co. 155 S.W.
2d 74, 79. 79 A.L.R. 1; annotation 79 A.L.R. 13; 25 C.J.
491-495, secs.61-65; Am. Jr. 366, sec.20; American Law
Institute Restatement of Torts, Vol. 1, pg.315, sec.136.
Applicable construction of analogous inference would be
that, Any unreasonable delay in withdrawing a detainer
from a person who is entitled to have said detainer
withdrawn......taking him before......would therefore
amount to false imprisonment.
Also applicable are a number of long established analogous
principals dealing with time related changes occurring in
the process and the proper legal obligations that are
required to maintain the validity of the process. In this
Supreme Court ruling of Ex parte Watkins, 32 U.S. 568
(U.S. Dist. Of Col. 1833), “a new capias ad satisfaciendum
may issue against him, which presupposes that he is not
then deemed to be in custody upon the old one.” at 577.
Aside from the fact that CR499-487FX should have been
dismissed upon expiration of “THE REQUEST” §§217.450. -
217.490. The inference here would be that if the
defendants had wanted to maintain any semblance of
legality under the prisoner detainer process they must
remove the old ones representing the previously dismissed
charges and lodge a new one that includes the extant
charge, if they do not issue a new detainer “it is
difficult to percieve upon what grounds it can be
maintained, that the party is to be detained.”
This “precept, in its terms, authorizes no detainer beyond
the return day. Upon what ground then can the court infer
it?” at 577. (Fn.12) Of course under the principals
of “form and substance” as well as that of “same
transaction” even this action would not have substantiated
their position.
The court in Watkins relies upon the “natural construction
of the terms of the act,” in order to draw inference of
a “uniform course of practice,” in the face of “no
previous instance.” at 577. This last reference would
necessitate that plaintiff has experienced inordinate
singular treatment in contravention of “the cogent
evidence of the law.” at 577. This theory requires that
the detainer became “functus officio beyond the return
day” and that plaintiffs “detention afterwards, was not,
justified by the process.” at 579. (Fn.13).
If not for the issuance of plaintiffs 3rd pre-trial
amendment information, indicating the unlawful nature of
the detainers, they would have been maintained against
plaintiff beyond the date of his scheduled parole release.
This detainer withdrawal which was forced by plaintiffs
unilateral action to defend himself of his constitutional
rights does not exonerate the responsible defendants from
the effects experienced as the result of the previous
principal act of unlawful detainment/false imprisonment.

NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
Although it could be argued that plaintiffs mental
suffering was intended, plaintiff has no definitive
evidence of this direct purpose, therefore the Tort of
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress will not be
brought. However the emotional/mental suffering that
plaintiff experienced as the result of the aforementioned
actions is a matter of substantive medical record,
(exhibits J1...J6) according to the events by which this
medical condition arose it is actionable under the Tort of
Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress. To plead such
a claim, petitioner must allege that, (1) “the defendant
should have realized that his conduct involved an
unreasonable risk of causing the distress, and (2) the
emotional distress or mental injury must be medically
diagnosable and must be of sufficient severity as to be
medically significant.” Bass v. Nooney, 646 S.W. 2d 765,
772-73 (Mo. 1983) see fn.4.
(1) Plaintiff asserts that by, (a) allowing parole release
under this pending charge, and (b) unlawfully compelling
plaintiff to appear in court for criminal proceedings on a
void offense, the defendants would have been aware of
plaintiffs mental trauma. (A convicted felon is still a
human being, just because a man has been to prison does
not mean he has no fear of it, some of us are victims of
societal wrongs ourselves, yet with maturity and knowledge
gain faith in rehabilitation and hope for a better
future.) (2) (exhibits J1...J6).

II. APPENDED COMPLAINT
UNDER THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT, 42 U.S.C. § 1983
I. Parties to this civil action:
A. Plaintiff: Douglas E. Roaden
Address: 2324 ½ S. Moffet Joplin, MO 64804

B. Defendant I: Jon Dermott
Title: Judge of the Circuit Court Division
III, of the County of Jasper, State of
Missouri.
Defendant II: Dean Dankelson
Title: The Prosecuting Attorney of the
County of Jasper, State of Missouri.
Defendant III: George Thomas
Title: Assistant Prosecuting Attorney of
the County of Jasper, State of Missouri.
Defendant IV: Blake Wolf
Title: Assistant Prosecuting Attorney of
the County of Jasper, State of Missouri.
Defendant V: Nick Marshall
Title: Assistant Prosecuting Attorney of
the County of Jasper, State of Missouri.
Defendant VI: Norm Rouse
Title: Assistant Prosecuting Attorney of
the County of Jasper, State of Missouri.
Defendant VII: W.J. Pierce
Title: Sheriff of the County of Jasper,
State of Missouri.

II. Plaintiff does request a jury trial. (If need
be)

III. Plaintiff does request monetary damages:
(See damage claims, pg. 18)

IV. Previous civil actions: (explanation in civil
action opening)

V. Counsel:
A. No one is assisting me with this case.
B. I have made fairly extensive efforts to
obtain legal assistance and will continue to do so.
C. I have not previously had any lawyer
representation with this matter.

CIVIL ACTION OPENING STATEMENT
When Federal District Judge Scott O. Wright dismissed
plaintiffs claims under 42 U.S.C. §1983 (exhibits
N50...N54) he did so under erroneous conclusions, based on
misinterpretation, his unsubstantiated summary dismissal
of legal frivolity was issued with ill defined
points,“Court is under a duty to examine complaint to
determine if allegations provide for relief on any
possible grounds.” White v. Bloom, 621 F. 2d 276, 279
(C.A. Mo. 1980). (1) INJUNCTIVE RELIEF: It is within the
federal courts jurisdiction to order the Department of
Corrections to expunge information that exists as the
result of a vacated unconstitutional conviction, as said
information constitutes a continuing violation of
plaintiffs constitutional rights, yet Judge Wright ignored
this optional request made by plaintiff. Plaintiffs
efforts to have the violating state circuit court amend
its order of dismissal have been unsuccessful to date,
(exhibits L11...L18). (2) JUDGE DERMOTT: Judge Wrights
case citations of Bradley v. Fisher, Pierson v. Ray, Smith
v. Bacon, White v. Bloom, Birch v. Mazander and Stump v.
Sparkman, do nothing to dispel and in fact support
plaintiffs position. The fact that State Circuit Judge
Dermott was acting in this matter under a loss of subject
matter jurisdiction was completely ignored. “...inquiry in
determining whether a defendant judge is immune from suit
is whether at the time he took the challenged action he
had jurisdiction over the subject matter before him.”
Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 357. (3) PROSECUTORS
DANKELSON, ROUSE, THOMAS, MARSHALL & WOLF: “We hold only
that in...” was conveniently left out of Judge Wrights
quotation from Imbler v. Pachtman, there is no case law or
principal that plaintiff has discovered that would afford
immunity to a prosecutor who acts in “contravention of the
law,” this is not “initiation or presentation,” nor can
such action be construed to be within the scope of his
duties as states advocate, or an integral part of the
judicial process. “Where the reason for the rule extending
absolute immunity to prosecutors disappears, it would be
truly monstrous to deny recovery.” Imbler, concurring
opinion at 1002, (4) SHERIFF PIERCE: As can be ascertained
by reading plaintiffs original §1983 action there was no
direct accusation against the sheriff, plaintiff merely
requested of the federal district court to determine with
whom the responsibility for a failure of notice lies, and
at that point whether or not a violation was to be
supported, furthermore, Judge Wright should have
understood according to the principals involved that
plaintiffs eventual guilty plea has nothing to do with
matters plead in relation to “NOTICE”. (5) PENDANT STATE
COURT CLAIMS: Upon affording plaintiff such an
inconsequential review and interpretation of his valid
legal contentions plaintiff accepts Judge Wrights leave to
pursue refiling in state court, with a request of this
State Court for a proper review of the federal rights
violations involved.
“Claims under §1983 are properly cognizable in the courts
of Missouri.” Stafford, at 681, “A petition for relief
based on §1983 must allege facts in support of two
elements: (1) deprivation of rights secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States, (2) under color
of state law or custom.” Stafford, at 681.

STATEMENT OF CLAIMS
By refusing to dismiss this charge (CR499-487FX) according
to statutory direction, upon the date of legal termination
of the process under provision of the U.M.D.D.L.
§§217.450. - 217.490. the defendants named herein violated
a number of plaintiffs constitutional rights, some of
which are clearly defined and easily identifiable, while
others will require interpretational application, claimed
violations are as follows:
(1) Plaintiffs right to Speedy Trial under the Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution as made
applicable to the State of Missouri by the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, this right is
also guaranteed by Article I, Section 10 and 18 (a) of the
Missouri Constitution. (2) By maintaining a wrongful
prisoner detainer against plaintiff the defendants caused
a facility transfer constraint to be imposed on plaintiff,
which had the effect of restricting plaintiff from
participating in certain rehabilitation programs within
the correctional system causing violations of (a) Equal
Protection Under the Law, and (b) Restricting Liberty,
under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution and Article I, Section 10 of the
Missouri Constitution. (3) By completing this
prosecutorial course of action and imprisoning plaintiff
the defendants deprived plaintiff of his constitutional
rights to (a) Speedy Trial, (b) Liberty, (c) Unreasonable
Seizure, (d) Due Process of Law, and (e) Freedom from
Warrant Issuance Without Probable Cause under the Fourth,
Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the United States
Constitution as made applicable to the State of Missouri
by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, (see exhibit A1 included with parcel for
licensed counsels reference in the aforementioned claims).

LEGAL THEORY
EQUAL PROTECTION UNDER THE LAW
There are cases that deal with the principals involved
with the enactment of the laws pertaining to detainers and
the deleterious effects they have upon prisoners,
situations such as the one plaintiff has had to endure
should not be allowed to occur. “Experience has shown that
once a charge or detainer is filed against an inmate ,
that inmates status within the prison changes adversely.”
(fn.14) State ex rel. Kemp v. Hodge, 629 S.W. 2d 353, 355
(Mo. Banc 1982), continued...“baleful effects of
detainers” in Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 89 S.Ct. 575,
21 L. Ed. 2d 607 (1969).
“In order to justify the disparate treatment of similarly
situated individuals, the state must demonstrate that the
difference at issue, bears a rational relation to some
legitimate end.” Carillo v. DuBois, 23 F. Supp. 103, 106
(D. Mass. 1998) citing Romer V. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631,
116 S.Ct. 1620, 134 L. Ed. 2d 855 (1996). There was no
justification for a continuation of the process, or valid
presumption for a legitimate end other than to dismiss
CR499-487FX upon termination date of 01/29/00.
While the “Constitution does not entitle any inmate to a
particular classification,...” Carillo, at 107, the
conditions from which this statement arose and the
principals set forth in cases such as this do not contain
extraneous influences, plaintiffs security classification
was first enhanced as the result of the pending Jasper
County charges, and then wrongfully maintained at an
enhanced level as the direct result of violations of his
constitutional rights being perpetrated from outside of
the correctional system, as these deprivations were a
direct derivative influence on plaintiffs confinement
status they must import to conditions that they effect
within the correctional system. The Jasper County
Officials “...offered no justification at all for the
decision to deprive...” plaintiff “...of the eligibility
for minimum security to which...” Carillo, at 106, he
would have otherwise been entitled, minus the unlawful
detainers.

RESTRICTION OF LIBERTY
The vocational training aspect of plaintiffs position was
mentioned in the negative in Carillo, “finding no liberty
interest......to continue in vocational training.” at 107.
Once again here we are dealing with an extraneous
influential source of deprivations, which should in effect
nullify any oppositional contentions to plaintiffs claim.
Plaintiffs instant situation, as will be shown, does in
fact “give rise to a liberty interest in the rights he
would have had if he had been incarcerated...” Carillo, at
107, without the influence of the unlawful detainer.
Romer v. Morganthau, 119 F. Supp. 2d 346 (S.D.N.Y. 2000),
presents an extensive explanation on how liberty interests
relate to prison work release, these principals are
analogous to the conditions plaintiff has experienced in
relation to his enhanced security status and thereby his
ineligibility for transfer in order to pursue a particular
rehabilitative course of action.
The Supreme Court has noted a distinction between “being
deprived of a liberty one has......and being denied a
conditional liberty one desires.” Greenholtz v. Inmates of
Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 9, 99
S.Ct. 2100, 60 L.Ed. 2d 668 (1979). Herein is the crux of
the matter, plaintiff was previously incarcerated at the
correctional center that offered the desired computer
literacy and S.A.T.O.P. programs that he had intended to
participate in prior to being reclassified and transferred
upon discovery of the Jasper County charges, a liberty
interest can be found under these and similar conditions:
The withdrawal of a privilege, (fn.15) “work release” in
Kim v. Hurston, 182 F. 3d 113, 117 (2nd Circuit
1999); “temporary release programs” in Dugar v. Coughlin,
613 F. Supp. 849, 856 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); “security
classification for parole consideration” in
Carillo; “security classification for transfer
consideration” in The Instant. It was determined by the
court that Mr. Carillo did in fact have a liberty interest
in classification status, and that the controlling
deprivational influence was derived from another
states/jurisdictions laws, Carillo, at 108.

FAILURE OF NOTICE
Without evidence to indicate otherwise plaintiff must
assume that the District Attorneys Office apprised the
Sheriffs Department of all 6 charges that were relevant to
this matter. General statements concerning “NOTICE”
abound, “Notice is an elementary and fundamental
requirement of due process.” U.S.C.A. Const. Amends. 5;
14. But nothing can be found dealing specifically with the
laws pertaining to the U.M.D.D.L / A.O.D. §§217.450 - 217-
490. If the Sheriffs Department did in fact receive all
relevant information concerning these charges, the
question would be who is responsible for insuring that
such information be properly included on any detainers
lodged therefrom, if in fact the District Attorneys Office
or the Court Clerk failed to notify the Sheriffs
Department then the burden of liability, if any be found,
lies with them.
In Conrad v. Perales, 92 F. Supp. 2d 175 (W.D.N.Y. 2000),
4 possible events can occur to determine a supervisory
officials personal involvement in a violation of a persons
federal rights, while a failure of notice in this instance
may or may not be considered a federal right, it in fact
was the root cause of all of the violations that occurred
in this matter. If relevancy be the only point at issue a
violation might be supported, plaintiff simply desires
that this issue be brought to light and given the
consideration that it deserves. “A supervisory official
who (1) directly participated, (2) after learning of the
violation, failed to remedy, (3) created a policy or
allowed such a policy to continue, or (4) who was
negligent in managing subordinates who caused the event,
would himself be liable for the violation in question.”
Conrad, at 186.

SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
“When state officer acts under state law in manner
violative of Federal Constitution he comes into conflict
with superior authority, and is stripped of his official
or representative character and subjected in his person to
consequences of his individual conduct; a state has no
power to impart to him any immunity from responsibility to
supreme authority of United States.” 42 U.S.C.A. §1983;
U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 11. Schuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232,
94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed. 2d 90, at 1687, 4,5,6. It would
also stand to reason that, a state has no obligation to
impart to him any immunity from responsibility to
authority of its own constitution and statutes.
DAMAGES
“Mental anguish is an actual damage in a suit of this
kind.” Mullen v. Dayringer, 705 S.W. 2d 531, 536 (Mo. App.
W.D. 1985), citing Young v. Jack Boringer Inc. 540 S.W. 2d
887, 893 (Mo. App. 1976). In Mullen, an award for actual
damages in the amount of $41.21 and punitive damages of
$12,500 were rendered as the result of a security guards
abuse of discretion in accosting a patron, causing said
patron embarrassment and thereby “mental anguish,” the
duration of the detention was approximately 15 minutes.
Plaintiff endured a total of 574 days of mental assault at
the hands of state officials who are expected to have
knowledge of the law and uphold the rights of citizens
according to the law. In Young, an award for $8,000 actual
and $25,000 punitive for stress and physical discomfort
resulting from the wrongful repossession of a television.
Both of these claims were upheld and determined to be non
excessive, plaintiffs damage claims will therefore reflect
the nature and duration of the violations he has endured.

DAMAGE CLAIMS ACTUAL
PUNITIVE
Unlawful Detainment-220 days. $22,000 State &
Federal Rights $150,000
C.P. Confinement-15 days. $1,500 (Due
Process, Speedy Trial, Equal
Parole Period-66 days. $66,000
Protection, Deprivation of Liberty,
False Imprisonment-274 days $274,000
Restriction of Liberty; Unreasonable
Computer Literacy $2,500
Seizure/Warrant Issuance.)
S.A.T.O.P. $240

P.P. Unemployment $2,400
State Tort $140,000
Mental Anguish-575+ days* $250,000 (Abuse of
Process; Malicious
Prosecution.)
Pro se legal fees-10% of award/settlement
or 1200 hrs. @ $20.00 pr. hr.
*(plaintiff still experiences anxiety concerning this
matter)

CLOSING STATEMENT
This matter began back in July of “99" as an effort to
have the law applied fairly to me, and has now become what
it is today due to the state officials involved either
being unable to understand or unwilling to apply said law,
this action is now an effort to have the law applied
equally to all. “But, if he has not jurisdiction of the
subject matter or of the party, his judicial acts in the
case are coram non judice, and void; and he, and all
persons concerned in executing his judgment, are
trespassers.” Stone v. Graves, 8 Mo. 148, 1843 WL 40011
(Mo.) 40 Am. Dec. 131.

Wherefore, plaintiff requests this court lend
consideration for proper legal determination, application
of the law and imposition of it’s authority on the matters
plead herein.

Respectfully Submitted

Douglas E. Roaden, Pro se.
2324 ½ S. Moffet
Joplin, MO 64804
417-206-8522

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Douglas E. Roaden do hereby certify that a true and
correct copy of the foregoing information was issued to
(1) Jasper County Circuit Clerk Linda Williams, (2 copies)
and (2) Jasper County Prosecuting Attorney Dean Dankelson,
(1 copy). By regular U.S. Mail, this 18th day of August,
2003.


Douglas E. Roaden, Pro se.

FACTS
(footnotes)

(fn.1) Plaintiff has yet to review any of the court files
pertaining to this matter, there is a memo in the P.D.
client case file indicating that no recording was made of
the arguments, (exhibit AA included with parcel) therefore
plaintiff remains ignorant of the trial courts exact
determination for continuing this matter after the initial
motion for dismissal under the U.M.D.D.L. there is a list
or chain of events (though not accurate as to the dates on
2 of the events listed) also found in the P.D. client case
file that indicates the court might have at one point
early on been inclined to dismiss all 3 charges, (see
exhibit BB2 included with parcel). What position presented
by the prosecution that was not contended and refuted by
blind supposition based on case law study in plaintiffs
pre-trial motion did the court use as a determining factor
to alter this presumed inclination and that would have
allowed the court to continue to pursue this erroneous
position in the face of valid legal contentions is unknown.

(fn.2) Plaintiff was not schooled in law and was unable to
construct a cohesive argument, however the principals
involved under the provisions of the U.M.D.D.L./A.O.D. as
well as all pertinent case laws cites were included, a
copy if each of these documents was without failure issued
to the court clerk, district attorneys office and the
public defenders office.

(fn.3) This 3rd amendment indicates the exact nature of a
detainer as well as the principal of form over substance,
proving according to these well established
interpretations and principals that CR499-487FX must be
inclusive of the original detainer, (same transaction and
form over substance had been included in prior pleadings)
this was intended to indicate that the prosecution could
not have it both ways, either they must acknowledge and
dismiss, or in order to maintain any semblance of legality
withdraw and lodge a new detainer. Their actual response
was not unexpected though still suprising, in order to
maintain their untenable position they took the only
avenue of escape, they withdrew yet failed to dismiss and
allowed plaintiff to walk out of prison with this charge
hanging over his head, (a charge that had a $15,000.00
bond set on 01/11/00 by Associate Judge Schoberl). This
action not only verified the unlawful nature of the
detainers but gives rise to state of mind, these actions
take the district attorneys office outside the framework
of official duty and into the realm of subterfuge.

(fn.4) Throughout this 218 period of unlawful detainment
plaintiffs security status was maintained at a heightened
level as the direct result of this illegal detainer,
because of this high level security status plaintiff was
unable to transfer back to the lower security level
facility where this ordeal began at Tipton, MO to
participate in SATOP, Business Technology / Computer
Literacy rehabilitation programs and then on to work
release as part of a rehab / re-integration program that
plaintiff had made effort to obtain upon entry into the
D.O.C. a positive experience upon release was initially
anticipated.

(fn.5) A state of psycological imprisonment was instilled
upon release and the fact of the condition of pending
prosecution prevented plaintiff from obtaining employment,
plaintiffs parole officer was unable to appreciate the
situation, (see exhibits H1...H3, note pg.2 para.3
violation / sentencing date) the combination of anxiety
and stress under these circumstances eventually brought
about a severe state of mental depression, (see exhibits
I1; I2 and J1...J6, note J5, axis I-line 4; axis IV).
Plaintiff was effectively rendered incapable of normal
societal functions.

(fn.6) Plaintiffs mental state had degraded to the point
of indecision and he could not maintain cognizant thought
processes, unable to report to his parole officer or
before the court a warrant was issued by each, according
to the letter of the law the P.O.'s was justified, however
the court was acting with no authority, and it was after
all the court which had brought all of this about.

(fn.7) After 174 days the trial court vacated this
sentence based on the same information presented pre-
trial, the only difference being that a post-conviction
states attorney from outside the violating jurisdiction
compiled and presented plaintiffs amended petition, (see
exhibits K1...K15, included with parcel).

(fn.8)The state tort claims were dismissed without
prejudice and it was suggested that plaintiffs issues be
pursued via state venue, plaintiff is attaching the
constitutional violations under 1983 to this action as the
federal court has not given a comprehensive analysis of
the principals involved, else plaintiff would not be
before this court today.

(fn.9) Plaintiffs P.D. did not inform him of this
correspondence, in fact she had indicated that the judge
would take no action on plaintiffs pleadings, it was not
until plaintiff obtained the P.D. casefile (Sept. of "01")
that he discovered this letter from the judge.

(fn.10) Two other possibilities arise, plaintiffs P.D.
(Kathleen Byrnes-Ales) mentioned that the prosecutor was
making a claim that no detainer had in fact been lodged on
CR499-487FX, on the premise that the state had no
obligation to lodge a detainer. Plaintiff concedes the
states lack of obligation, but as I told Mrs. Ales they
had in fact already lodged a detainer on said charge under
the principal of "same transaction" they just refused to
acknowledge plaintiffs position. She also mentioned that
the term "on the basis" to be found at RSMo. 217.450. sec.
I, as implying that CR499-487FX was not an elemental or
component part of the "basis" of the detainer that had
been placed, plaintiff suggested to all parties concerned
in his pre-trial pleadings that they examine the actual
definition of the terms involved and apply interpretation.

(fn.11) Plaintiff feels it might be worth mentioning here
that the defendant prosecutors might have been under the
impression that if plaintiff were allowed to be released
on parole his claim of violation under the U.M.D.D.L.
might be nullified. During plaintiffs parole release
period in an office interview with Mrs. Ales, it was
intimated that plaintiff might no longer be under the
protection of the provisions afforded and offered a case
law report, State v. Sederburg, 25 S.W. 3d 172 (Mo. App.
2000) that indicated a prisoners release from confinement
and subsequent loss of protection under the U.M.D.D.L. (it
did not apply).Plaintiff feels this point was being
presented by Mrs. Ales as one of the prosecutions
contentions, this could have been the reasoning for the
District Attorneys Office electing to take no action under
a new detainer placement upon withdrawal of the originals.

(fn.12) There appears to be no directives or case law in
place to consider and apply to plaintiffs particular
circumstance in that no allowance is made for maintainment
of prisoner detainers beyond the 180 day time limit. This
case apparently has no precedent in many respects,
therefore the inferences drawn from Watkins and Teel
develop an enhanced import.

(fn.13) Granted plaintiff was at the time committed on
execution of another sentence, plaintiffs reference to
detention applies to restriction under the wrongful
prisoner detainer, which had the effect of producing
federal rights violations among other problems.

(fn.14) From an objective point one would not notice the
differences in the conditions and opportunities available
between facilities, subjective experience allows the
plaintiff to be able to appreciate what few privaledges
there are. These opportunities are difficult to manuever
into and the computer literacy program at Tipton is a much
sought after and accredited course, a certificate with
applicable college credits would have been beneficial upon
release.

(fn.15) In the instant case, an extraneous derivative
influence that caused a removal from privaledged security
status. Plaintiff was first assigned to the minimum
security facility he requested at Tipton with the
intention of participating in rehabilitative courses that
were unavailable at most facilities, he was transferred to
Cameron upon discovery of the pending Jasper County
charges where these courses are not available, at Cameron
his institutional parole officer Mr. King commended his
ambition for continuing education and suggested that he
would be transferred back to Tipton upon completion of the
detainer process.

VIOLATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, 8/25/03, by D.E.ROADEN.

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